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THE CHANGING TRADITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF SIGN AND
BILLBOARD REGULATION
Ronald H. Rosenberg
Professor of Law at the William and Mary Law School
Williamsburg, Virginia
The twentieth century has been an unparalleled
period of growth and change in the United States. In
1900, the total U.S. population stood at just over
seventy-six million people while almost Qne hundred
years later it has nearly reached two hundred and
seventy-five million. Change has also occurred in the
form of growth and development and during the last
quarter century we have ceased to be a nation
predominantly of city dwellers to become a country of
suburbanites with more than more than fifty percent of
the nation 's residents living in metropolitan suburbs.
Although change has been the watchword over this
century, certain local government concerns have
remained constant. One such consistent issue has been
the municipal desire to regulate the aesthetic quality of
the community under the authority of the police power.
As the discussion below will reveal, sign regulation has
been a local government policy goal and one which has
been legally controversial and frequently litigated
throughout much of this period. Sign regulation, as one
form of police power-based land use control, touches a
number of constitutional values and throughout the
century has encountered a changing series of
constitutional law challenges reflective of the changing
mix in emphasis of those values. The general thesis of
this article is that over the century judicial review of sign
regulation, as an aspect of aesthetic regulation, has
become more hospitable and in recent years this form of
land use control has generally emerged intact.

Part 1. Early Twentieth Century Sign
and Billboard Control: The Journey
to Finding Aesthetic Regulation
within the Police Power

related to municipal improvement and the achievement
of quality of life and aesthetic goals for urban places.
One aspect of this desire to beautify cities was the
control and occasionally the elimination of signs. The
burgeoning commercial life of the turn of the century
developed a world where signs began to be viewed as a
form of visual pollution justifying municipal regulation
based upon the state's police power.
Municipal attempts to control the location and
composition of signs coincides ~ith the urbanization of
the United States which was accelerating at the last turn
of the century. Although a strong public desire to
improve the visuaJ characteristics of the urban
environment existed at this time, state courts were
surprisingly reluctant to approve early twentieth centUry
local government sign regulations. Even though the
authority to exercise regulatory power was usually not in
doubt, American courts appeared concerned that an
ordinary use of land for a previously lawful business
would be eradicated in order to satisfy the subjective
tastes of public authorities. The use of police power
regulatory devices for the avoidance of such aesthetic or
visual harms was difficult for most courts to support in
the frrst decade of the century. This restrictive view of
municipaJ sign regulation coincides with increased
substantive due process analysis which resulted in the
invalidation of many state laws as reflected by the
famous Lochner decision. The following quote from a
prominent New Jersey case captures the sentiment of the
times.

Municipalities have attempted to regulate signs
throughout the twentieth century . . At the turn of the
century, there was a surge in interest in classical urban
architectural design and monumental city planning. This
emphasis, which has been termed the City Beautiful
Movement by urban historians, is believed to have
developed as an outgrowth of the Chicago World's Fair
of 1893. This movement affected more than just the
design of large public buildings like the New York
Public Library and the form of city planning like the
McMillan Plan for Washington, D.C. As a complex
cultural movement, it emphasized a range of values
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We think the control attempted to be
exercised is in excess of that essential
to effect the security of the public. It is
probable that the enactment of ... the
ordinance was due rather to aesthetic
considerations than to considerations
of the public safety. No case has been
cited, nor are we aware of any case
which holds that a man may be
deprived of his property because his
tastes are not those of his neighbors.
Aesthetic considerations are a matter
of lUXUry and indulgence rather than of
necessity, and it is necessity alone
which justifies the exercise of the

police power to take property without
compensation.
City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising &
Sign Painting Co .. 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267-8 (Err. &
App. 1905).
Although some of the earliest sign
regulation decisions were grounded in other
non-aesthetic police power justifications, state courts
generally
ruled
against such
regulations
as
"unauthorized" under the police power. This criticism
recognized the unfamiliarity of aesthetic control as well
as the perceived danger of encouraging personally
subjective forms of municipal regulation. The
overarching themes during this period were that signs
constituted an acceptable and natural land use and that
the approval of aesthetically-based regulation would lead
to a tyrannical majoritarianism disconnected from
.~ditional police power concerns. As a result, numerous
cases struck down municipal billboard bans, I sign size
and setback limitations/ and parkway location
prohibitions. J
These early holdings, while usually striking
down the sign restrictions based upon illegitimate
aesthetic purposes, would occasionally acknowledge
other valid police power purposes for sign controls.
These justifications, which gradually appeared in later
cases, emphasized issues of public safety by being blown
down, falling, burning, or coming into contact with
electric wires,4 and the preservation of property values
as an additional acceptable rationale. 5 Some opinions
during this early period would find extremely inventive,
non-aesthetic rationales for limiting signs. For instance,
in St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), the Missouri

court found that signs were "constant menaces to the
public safety and welfare of the city" in that they
"endanger the public health, promote inunorality,
constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all
classes of miscreants." Whether or not using these
extended rationales, reviewing courts slowly began to
rule more favorably on sign and billboard regulation as
they came to accept the protection of community
aesthetic quality as a valid police power purpose.
Adverse court decisions did not deter local
governments nor abate popular support for sign controls.
In the 1920's, local governments in most urban areas
came under public pressure to limit billboards and other
signs. The rapid urban and suburban expansion of this
period drove municipal action to plan and regulate the
form of the physical environment. During this period,
courts demonstrated increasing receptivity to the
municipal use of the police power to control community
development. Prominent in this development was the
judicial approval of the local government use of
planning and zoning techniques found to be
constitutional in 1926 in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272
U.S. 365 (1926). With the approval ofland use control
in Euclid, courts increasingly began to rule more
approvingly on municipal efforts to regulate signs and
billboards. They did so by altering their analysis by
accepting aesthetics as one of the appropriate
governmental goals for regulation under the police
power. At base, this had previously represented a serious
substantive due process problem for this form of land
use regulation. Courts needed to determine that the
exercise of governmental power for the protection of
aesthetic values could be considered to be a valid
regulatory object so as to satisfy the demands of due

Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318,100 P. 867 (1909) and Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 NJ.L.
72, 58 A. 342 (Sup. Ci. 1904).
2
Curran Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 26t" (1910); City of Chicago v.
Gunning System, 114 III. App. 377, afrd 214111628,73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756,33 P.
476 (1893); City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting. Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (E
& A 1905) (Sup Ct. 1904); Federal Advertising Com. v. Recorder of Borough of Fair Lawn, 8 NJ.Misc. 619, 151 A.
285 (Sup. Ct. 1930); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908).
3
Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School. 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911); Commonwealth v .
• Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905).

Cream City Bill Posting Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 86, 147 N.W. 25 (1914) (upholding Milwaukee
sign ordinance on safety grounds); Horton v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co., 36 R.I. 507, 90 A. 822 (I 914) (upholding
Providence sign ordinance upheld for safety reasons); and State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911)
(upholding Ashville ordinance requiring billboards to be at least two feet off the ground to prevent collection of
leaves and other debris creating the risk of fire and unsanitary conditions).

4

Metromedia. Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); John Donnelly & Sons. Inc. v. Outdoor
Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492. 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).

5
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process review. Rather than accepting aesthetic purposes
as a freestanding police power purpose, states courts
beginning in the 1930's and 1940's -took an intennediate
approach which held that aesthetic goals could be an
appropriate governmental purpose as long as it was
found to be supplementary to the achievement of other,
traditional police power goals. Consequently, court
opinions during this time usually discussed a long list of
conventional police power factors connected to safety,
morality, health and general welfare of the community to
create a composite justification for the regulation. 6
As late as 1969, the Virginia Supreme Court
had expressed this same sentiment in Kenyon Peck v.
Kennedy, 2] 0 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969), where it
upheld a section of Arlington County's zoning ordinance
which prohibited outdoor moving signs. Concurring in
the view that aesthetic values could not, standing alone,
support the exercise of the police power, this court said
that,
although aesthetic considerations
alone may not justify police
regulations, the fact that they enter
into the reasons for the passage of an
act or ordinance will not invalidate it if
other elements within the scope of the
police power are present.

The upgrading of aesthetic objectives as a
legitimate basis for municipal sign regulation over the
course of this century has finally reached the point where
it can be said that the clear majority rule holds that
aesthetics alone constitutes a legitimate governmental
purpose without the necessity of establishing more
traditional police power support. 8 Echoed in a series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions including Bennan v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); and Penn Central v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the idea that "it is
within the power of the legislature to detennine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled" has tinnly established the principle
that aesthetics constitutes an important local government
purpose. In practice, modem cases usually find that sign
regulations advance simultaneous public purposes
including the prevention of visual clutter, traffic safety
and the protection of tourism. The overall result has
been the expanded use of municipal sign and billboard
restriction pursuant to general or specific enabling
authority granted in state enabling legislation.

Part 2. Recognizing First Amendment
Values in Sign Regulation

Is!.. at 63, 168 S.E.2d 120. Consequently, as long as
there was another valid police power purpose for the
prohibition - such as traffic safety as in Kenyon Peck the existence of an additional aesthetic justification did
not invalidate the restriction. Reviewing courts in
Virginia have not always been so accepting of local
government explanations of regulatory purpose and have
even second-gueSSed legislative motives. In the 1975
case of Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128,
146, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1976), the Kenyon Peck
rationale was used to strike down a county's architectural
design review requirement because its "predominant
purpose ... [was] to promote aesthetic values and the
purpose recited in the ordinance to prote<:t property
values was merely an incidental goal." It is ironic that in
its most recent decisions, the Fourth Circuit has held that
aesthetic justifications, by themselves, are sufficient
governmental interests to support a municipal sign
ordinance from First Amendment attack. 7

If signs were considered to be merely structural
aspects of a community, like houses, roads, schools,
stores, they would easily be regulated with genera] land
use control authority. However, signs are structures
imbued with a special characteristic: their function is
principally that of communication of a particular
message. The exact message will vary depending upon
the wishes of the sign owner and can range from site
infonnation, commercial product and price data,
inspirational religious and political messages, to just
about any meaning that the owner wishes to
communicate to the public. While outdoor signs are not
the only method of communication, they represent an
important avenue of idea transmission to a potentially
large public audience. Due to this connection of the sign
being a structure as well as a communicative device, it is
not hard to predict that constitutional First Amendment
values eventually would come into conflict with a
locality's polir.e power authority to regulate or ban a sign
in the name .:>f community land use control. It is the

6

Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526. 529-30 (I YI7) (upholding Chicago billboard zoning
ordinance without specific mention of aesthetic concerns); Mumhy. Inc. v. Town of West POrt, 131 Conn. 292, 40
A.2d 177 (1944) (harming public health by ads for liquor and tobacco) and Little Pep Demonic Restaurant. Inc. v.
Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960).
7

8

See Georgia Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43. 46 (4th Cir. 1987).
D. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 11 .05 (4th ed. 1997).
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balance of these two competing forces which sets the
framework for the current discussion of the law of sign
and billboard control.
The United States Supreme Court has only
recently become interested in applying First Amendment
doctrine to the subject of sign regulation. Although it
previously had struck down municipal prohibition of
residential "for saJe" signs in Linmark Associates. Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro. 431 U.S. 85 (1977), its main
discussion of commercial and non-commercial sign
regulation has more recently emerged. Three principal
decisions - Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981) ("Metromedia"), City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
("Vincent"), and City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 512 U.S. 43,
114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) ("City of Ladue") - set out the
central corpus of constitutional First Amendment theory
for evaluating municipal efforts to regulate signs. Each
of these decisions deserves separate attention.
A. Metromedia
In Metromedia, San Diego had passed an
ordinance which generally banned "outdoor advertising
display signs" while exempting two categories of signs
from the ban's coverage. The first exempted category
included onsite signs that identified the premises or the
products manufactured, produced, or sold there. The
second category exempted twelve carefully defmed
categories including governmental and temporary
political signs. Discerning the meaning of the
Metromedia decision is not easy since the Supreme
Court split into three blocks that drafted a total of five
opinions: a plurality opinion of four Justices, a
concurrence of two other Justices and three separate
dissents. The following discussion will attempt to distill
the concrete points of majority agreement.

I. Upholding the Prohibition of Offsite
Commercial Outdoor Signs and
Billboards

The four Justice plurality and the three
dissenters all agreed that the San Diego ordinance was
constitutional as it applied to the general commercial
otfsite billboard ban. The analytical framework for
reaching this conclusion was the four part test for
evaluating commercial speech restrictions adopted in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corn. v. Public Service
Commission. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Central Hudson
standard contains the following elements:

a) The First Amendment protects commercial speech
only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected
commercial speech is valid only if it.
b) seeks to implement a substantiaJ governmental
interest,
c) directly advances that interest, and
d) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the
given objective.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507. The analysis resulted in a
conclusion upholding the constitutionality of the San
Diego general off'site commercial sign ban. The speech
was protected under the first prong of the test since it
was not deceptive nor unlawful. The second element
was met because the restrictions implemented the city's
"substantial" interest in safety and aesthetics. The four
Justice plurality agreed that the ordinance did directly
advance safety and aesthetic values, acknowledging "the
accumulated, commonsense judgments of local
lawmakers" without demonstrated scientific justification.
Id. at 509. This was true even if local decisionmakers
chose to restrict commercial billboards offsite and not
onsite.
The general conclusion from Metromedia is
that all commercial billboards can be constitutionally
banned either totally or partially. Importantly, the city
was not required to present scientific or other highly
detailed proof that the billboard ban advanced safety and
aesthetic quality with the Court willingly to rely on
common sense and the experience oflocallegislators.9
2. The Ordinance Exemptions Deemed
Unconstitutional

The San Diego ordinance contained two
exemptions from the general prohibition. The first
category excluded onsite signs identifying the premises
and the products sold at the location. This was viewed
by the Court as limiting the content of onsite signs to
commercial messages and banning non-commercial
ones. The four Justice plurality interpreted this feature as
a
preference
for
commercial
speech
over
non-commercial
speech
and
consequently
unconstitutional. Id. at 513.
The second category of exemptions defined
twelve types of signs permissible in spite of the general
ban on offsite signs. Seven of the twelve exempted types
were defmed by their content - including a variety of

Later case decisions reaffirm this position. See e.g., Ackerley Communications of the Northwest. Inc. v.
Krochaiis, 108 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997).

9
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governmental signs and temporary political signs - and
the plurality opinion ruled that this part of the ordinance
violated essential first amendment principles that noncommercial speech is entitled to the highest level of
protection and that government may not pick and choose
between forms of acceptable non-commercial speech.
B. Vincent
In the Vincent decision, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), a
Los Angeles ordinance prohibited the posting of any
type of sign on public property. The Court,. in a 6 to 3
ruling, upheld the ordinance in a challenge by a
candidate for local political office who had campaign
signs, placed on the crossbars of electric power poles,
removed by the city. Vincent asserted that the law was
an unconstitutional interference with his First
Amendment right to free political speech. The Court
concluded that the ordinance was a "viewpoint neutral"
time, place and manner regulation following the analysis
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

In conclusion, the Vincent opinion has held that
an ordinance prohibiting signs form public property is
constitutionally permissible if 1) the property is not a
public forum, 2) the ban is a viewpoint neutral, 3) the
prohibition satisfies the United States v. O'Brien tests,
and 4) it leaves open adequate alternative channels of
communication.
C.

City of Ladue

City of Ladue, 114 S. Ct. 2043 (1994),
presented an exclusive St. Louis suburb prohibiting
homeowners from displaying all signs yet providing ten
classes of exceptions including those for residence
identification, safety hazard, and "for sale" signs. In
addition, the ordinance allowed churches, schools, and
some nonprofit organizations to display signs forbidden
at residences. Commercial signs were also exempted in
commercial or industrial zones. The city's main focus
was the elimination of residential signs. This case was
brought by a city resident prohibited from displaying a
small 8 112 by 11 inch window sign reading "For Peace
in the Gulf." A unanimous Court determined that the
municipal law violated the First Amendment.

The city defended its ordinance largely on an
aesthetic basis seeking to prevent signs from creating
"visual clutter" in its affluent residential neighborhoods.
The Court accepted the city's claim that the regulation
was neutral as to sign content or viewpoint. 'o However,
its major analytical focus was upon 1) the significance of
the government's interests and 2) the existence of
alternative channels of communication for traditionally
protected political speech. On the first of these two
elements - aesthetics - the Court seemed less convinced
of the city's interest even though this value had been
recognized as being significant in the Metromedia and
Vincent cases. Casting doubt on the city's suggested
justifications for the prohibitory ordinance including ten
categories of exemption, Justice Stevens concluded that
the exemptions "may diminish the credibility of the
government's [aesthetic] rationale for restricting speech
in the ftrst place." Id. at 2044. This statement raises
some doubt about municipal efforts to design a
non-uniform, prohibitory sign ordinance and at least
would seem to require a convincing, rational justification
for the exemption.
The second element of the City of Ladue
holding - the availability of alternative channels of
communication - focuses the emphasis on the traditional
or non-commercial nature of the speech involved.
Following this holding, an ordinance forbidding political
message signs at residences would seem to be
unconstitutional under nearly any interpretation of the
case. The sweeping ban on the most protected form of
speech, eliminating a "cheap and convenient" form of
communication, at such a location most closely
associated with individual liberty and expression would
appear to have no equivalent alternative channel of
communication. Interestingly, this total ban on
residential private property was struck down while
Metromedia's ban on commercial billboards and
Vincent's prohibition of signs on public property were
both constitutionally permissible.
Ultimately, the facts in the City of Ladue case
can be understood as presenting an example of
municipal regulatory extremism with little convincing
justification. In its conclusion the Court notes that "we
are confident that more temperate measures could in
large part satisi)' Ladue's stated regulatory needs without
harm to the F :st Amendment rights of its citizens." Id.
at 2047. Just exactly what "temperate measure" it had in

10

Although Justice O'Connor, concurring, did not accept this assumption and would have preferred to test the
city's ordinance as a content-based restriction. She said, "with rare exceptions, content discrimination in regulations
of the speech of private citizens on private property or in a traditional public forum is presumptively impermissible,
and this presumption is a very strong one." 114 S. Ct. at 2047. Certainly, though, she would have reached the same
conclusion as Justice Stevens.
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Second, a locality's governmental interests
supporting sign and billboard regulation - usually traffic
safety and aesthetics - have been completely accepted by
the Fourth Circuit to the point that a challenge is
"foreclosed." Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 833 F.2d at
46. Basing its holding on this point on language in the
Metromedia decision, the Fourth Circuit does not appear
interested in examining the validity of governmental
purposes underlying sign regulations and will not
consider an argument that such an ordinance is "merely"
an aesthetic regulation and therefore not rationally
related to legitimate police power purposes. Attempts to
derail such an ordinance by highlighting the weakness of
the traffic safety justification would seem doomed to
failure.
Third, the only potential serious First
Amendment concern derived from the Metromedia case
was the allegedly preferential treatment accorded to
commercial over non-commercial speech by virtue of
definitions or exceptions benefiting commercial signs.
See 453 US. at 509-10. This had been a major issue in
San Diego's ordinance in Metromedia and it is often
present in sign regulations barring off-premises signs yet
allowing a broad range of on-site commercial
advertising. The Fourth Circuit found in all three of
these decisions that an ordinance could be "saved" from
this attack by a feature which allows a non-commercial
sign in any situation where a commercial sign would be
lawfulY This technique has been copied in other Fourth
Circuit jurisdictions and has received approval in recent
cases. I. The only U.S. District Court decision in Virginia
considering such an issue - Jackson v. City of
Charlottesville - ruled that a city law permitting on-site
commercial signs but prohibiting virtually all
non-commercial communication and all off-site
advertising of any nature violated the First Amendment.
659 F. Supp. 470, 473 (1987).
In Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of
Newport News, 236 Va. 370,387-88,373 S.E.2d 917,
926-27 (1988), the Virginia Supreme Court also struck
down the city's sign ordinance rejecting the argument
that the regulation was a valid time, place and manner
regulation and fmding that it impermissibly favored

commercial over non-commercial speech. U The court
based its decision on both the Virginia and the United
States Constitutions although only citing federal case
decisions. Viewing this discrepancy as a content-based
distinction according higher value to commercial speech,
the Virginia court noted that the ordinance did not
contain a general exemption for all noncommercial
communication. Although never referring to the
contemporaneous Fourth Circuit decisions, this allusion
suggested that non-commercial speech be provided with
at least equal public access with commercial speech in
order to be constitutional.
C. Focused Prohibition of Signs and
Billboards on an Industry Specific
Basis
During the last few years local governments
have attempted to restrict the advertising of certain
products thought to be harmful to minors. In particular,
localities have designed billboard and sign ordinances to
prohibit the advertisement of cigarettes and alcoholic
beverages in certain publicly visible areas. These
industry-specific sign restrictions were adopted in
Baltimore, Maryland in early 1994 and have since
undergone judicial review to determine their
compatibility with constitutional commercial speech
norms. In both instances, these "focused" sign
prohibition ordinances have been upheld by the Fourth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.
In Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. City
of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), and
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th
Cir. 1995), the appeals court viewed the city's effort to
limit the advertisement of products as implementing an
important and well-considered social policy of not
encouraging minors to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes.
Both cases, facial challenges to each respective
ordinance, followed the rule announced in the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corp. v. Public Servo Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980), which placed the burden upon the local
government to justify its legislative action in enacting
each law regulating commercial speech. However, even

The Waynesville ordinance in Georgia Outdoor Advertising contained language that "any sign authorized in this
ordinance is allowed to contain non-commercial copy in lieu of other copy." 833 F.2d at 46. While the Raleigh
ordinance in Major Media stated that "nothing in this ordinance ... shall apply to non-commercial signs." 792 F.2d at
1271.
13

14

Revere National Com.

V.

Prince George's County, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17337.

15 The court struck down the entire ordinance, ignoring the severability argument, based upon its appraisal that the
restrictions on commercial and non-commercial speech were "inextricably intertwined."
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though it was undertaking "intermediate scrutiny" of the
commercial speech regulation, the court did not defme
the locality's burden too high nor make the court's review
too intrusive. Judge Niemeyer wrote in Schmoke that,
the court's inquiry is limited to
consideration of the ordinance on its
face against the background of the
government's objective and the
prospect of the ordinance's general
effect. If it appears to the court that the
legislative body could reasonably have
believed, based on data, studies,
history, or common sense, that the
legislation would directly advance a
substantial governmental interest, the
government's burden of justifying it is
met.
63 F.3d at 1311. Then, the court applied the now
common Central Hudson four-part test to detennine the
constitutionality of the Baltimore regulations. Under
Central Hudson, in order for commercial speech to be
entitled to any First Amendment protection, the speech
must (1) concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
If it meets those threshold elements, local government
may still regulate it if (2) the government is able to assert
a substantial interest in support of the regulation; (3) it
demonstrates that the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest; and (4) the regulation is not more
extensive , than necessary to serve the government's
interest. 447 U.S. at 563-66.
In its analysis the Fourth Circuit had no
difficulty in finding that prongs one and two had been
met finding that protecting minors from the hann of
cigarettes and alcohol were obviously substantial
governmental purposes. However, the main dispute
focused upon the third and fourth factors in the Central
Hudson test. Prong three required that the sign
regulation "directly advance" the governmental interests.
It is notable that the test set out only requires a "logical
nexus" between the government's ends and the means it
has selected. This relationship need not be as strict a
nexus as that required for tort causation and it does not
have to demonstrate that the regulation is the perfect
policy choice. The locality must only show that "it was
reasonable for the legislative body to conclude that its
goal would be advanced in some material respect by the
regulation." 63 F.3d at 1313. Ultimately, a reviewing
court will evaluate the "reasonableness" of the local
government's belief that the means chosen will advance
its ends. In Schmoke the court placed emphasis on the
city council's findings and the explicit reference to

research studies to reinforce the reasonableness of its
action.
A more serious issue lay in the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test - that is, whether the commercial
speech regulation "is not more extensive than is
necessary" to serve the identified governmental interest.
This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "narrow
tailoring" element. Although the city's declared purpose
was to insulate minors from the reach of cigarette and
alcoholic beverage advertisements, its sign restrictions
clearly also prevented adults from receiving the
commercial messages. While this concerned the court, it
ruled that local governments must be given "some
reasonable latitude" in dealing with serious social
problems. 63 F.3d 1316. Consequently, the ordinances,
especially considering their exemptions for commercial
and industrial zones, although not perfect were
sufficiently well tailored to satisfy Central Hudson's
fourth prong. It is not clear how much deference courts
will give to the achievement of less compelling public
purposes with weaker background support for the
technique chosen.
D.

Sign Regulation Affecting
Non-Commercial Speech

While this area is one of free speech, rarely
does a case present a non-commercial or traditional free
speech interest challenging a municipal sign control
ordinance. However, in Arlington County Republican
Committee v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1993), such a case arose. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin
the county's sign ordinance in four ways: (1) limiting the
number of temporary signs that could be posted in
residential districts to two; (2) allowing seven work days
for the processing of sign pennit applications; (3)
prohibited portable signs except for bumper stickers and
owner identifications; and (4) limiting the content of
signs at commercial sites to the advertising of products
or services available on the premises. In the U.S. District
Court, plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of all four of these ordinance provisions
based upon the conclusion that the requirements either
were not narrowly tailored, did not serve stated interests,
or favored commercial over non-commercial speech.

On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court's
focus concentrated solely on the issue of the county's
limiting the number of temporary signs. The other issues
had been rendered moot by the county's action in
amending its sign ordinances to allow expressly
non-commercial speech whenever the sign regulation
would pennit commercial speech and by requiring a
temporary sign permit decision within twenty-four hours.
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The court carefully analyzed both the Supreme Court's
and its own precedent before concluding there was no
controlling Fourth Circuit opinion. Distinguishing this
case on the basis that prior cases had dealt with
commercial signs or billboards and that this litigation
involved regulation infringing upon highly protected,
political speech, it then analyzed the regulation using
"more exacting scrutiny." 983 F.2d at 592.
Using factors derived from United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the court concluded that
the two-sign limit 1) burdened speech, 2} was content
neutral and 3) furthered substantial governmental
interests in aesthetics and safety. However, the
remaining two elements of the O'Brien test were found
lacking. First, the court determined that the two-sign rule
was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the identified
governmental goals. Placing the burden upon the county,
the Fourth Circuit was not convinced that the limitation
was needed to achieve the aesthetic and safety objectives
and furthermore, that there were other, less restrictive
means to achieve the same results. Secondly, the court
ruled that the two-sign limit did not provide sufficient
alternatives for political speech rejecting those suggested
by the county as being too time consuming or too
expensive. The court believed that the two-sign limit left
"no viable alternative means of political speech." 983
F.2d at 594. In conclusion, the decision in Arlington
County Republican Committee resonates with the same
ideas that the U.S. Supreme Court would express in City
of Ladue a year later. Eliminating or severely restricting
a form of traditional personal expression in residential
settings appears to require extensive and highly
convincing municipal justification.
E.

Constitutionally Valid Sign and
Billboard Regulation as an
Unconstitutional Taking of
Property

With the successful defense of most municipal
sign and billboard ordinances from First Amendment
attack, local governments must be aware of another
constitutionally-based challenge which has emerged to
threaten local government ordinances. Commercial sign
companies have raised the argument that an otherwise
valid sign regulation may still violate the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, that is, the sign controls
prohibiting sign use and new construction, they argue,
constitute a taking of commercial property without just
compensation. With the upsurge in interest in private
property rights as manifested in the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Nollan v. California
16
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Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (]992); and
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), it is
hardly surprising that such an argument would be raised
by a previously lawful business that has its operations
ended or substantially curtailed as a result of such an
ordinance.
Not surprisingly the Fourth Circuit has ruled
that the taking claim "obviously presents a federal
question,,16 and that the federal courts cannot divert such
a claim to the state courts. However, while the taking
argument has been regularly raised in federal litigation
since the mid-1980's, it has not found any notable
success for the plaintiffs. In Major Media the sign
company challenged the city's 5 ]/2 year grace or
amortization period as being so unreasonable so as to
constitute a "taking" of property. 792 F.2d at ]273.
While the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had not
presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of
fact, the court did focus upon the "reasonableness" of the
amortization period. The trial court had identified the
factors of ]) the length of time of the amortization
period and 2) whether the public gain achieved
outweighs the private loss suffered by sign owners as
being determinative, yet the appeals court did not
analyze this issue.
The third case in the Fourth Circuit's trilogyNaegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham,
844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988) - presented a municipal
billboard ordinance which prohibited all commercial,
offsite advertising except those along interstate or
primary highways. This ordinance had the effect of
banning, after a 5 1/2 year amortization period, 85
billboards out of a total of 13 7 that the company
operated in the Durham area. Acknowledging that the
takings inquiry is a fact sensitive one, the court found
that the granting of the city's summary judgment motion
without a fully developed factual record to be grounds
for a remand. The court then looked to three U.S.
Supreme Court decisions to provide the doctrinal basis
for evaluating the taking claims. Analyzing this
constitutional law framework yields legal conclusions
favorable to the regulation of commercial signs.
First, the appellate court set the general takings
analysis from the two-part test announced in the
Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
225,260 (1980). Under this ruling, a land use regulation
affects an unconstitutional taking of property ifit I} does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or 2}
denies the owner the economically viable use of the

Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43,47 (4th Cir. 1987).
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land. Having concluded that the ordinance did advance a
legitimate state interest in the protection of aesthetics,
the court concentrated on the second factor in the Agins
test. At this point, the analysis turned to the question of
identifying the appropriate unit of property upon which
to evaluate the economic effect. This inquiry serves as a
crucial point in the takings analysis since if the owner's
property interest is defmed expansively then the
regulatory impact will have lesser economic effect than
if the property interest is narrowly construed.
Importantly, the Fourth Circuit looked to two Supreme
Court cases - Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and Penn Central which applied a wholistic analysis to the takings
question and in neither case found an unconstitutional
regulation. Approving of this view the court quoted from
Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central which noted
that,

company of the economically viable use of its property
by applying a three step balancing test taken from the
Penn Central case. 438 U.S. at 124. The Penn Central
factors include: I) the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, 2) the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,
and 3) the character of the governmental action.
Applying these factors, the trial court concluded that the
Durham ordinance did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The crucial point in this analysis was the conclusion that
the relevant unit of property for takings clause analysis
was the broad array of signs owned by the plaintiff.
Since a portion of the sign business, so defined, had
been left intact, the Penn Central test had been satisfied.
It is unclear what the result would have been had the unit
of property been described as one or a finite number of
signs and all had been prohibited by ordinance. The
answer to that question awaits further litigation.

'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of
the action and on the nature of the
interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole--here the city tax block
designated as the 'landmark site.'

The lessons derived from this brief review of
the developing jurisprudence of sign regulation are
several. First, it is clear that local governments and their
constituencies have consistently supported the use of
regulatory power to control both the form and location
of signs and billboards throughout the century. Second,
each attempt to accomplish this aesthetic purpose has
been met by litigation resistance from the advertising
industry and civil libertarians wishing to advance their
own interests. Third, the tactics and arguments made by
these opponents have varied over this period but have
often raised issues framed in constitutional law terms.
These constitutional arguments have changed with the
changing emphasis of constitutional values in the nation.
Sign regulation cases have come to reflect the ebb and
flow of the prevailing constitutional theory. The local
government attorney must be aware of this complex and
changing tradition in ordinance drafting and defense,
never forgetting that sign and billboard regulation is an
area of land use control enveloped with special
constitutional concerns and sensitivity.

107 S. Ct. at 1248.
Adopting this approach, the district court, on
remand, determined that the appropriate unit of property
for purposes of the takings analysis was the sign
company's business in the Durham metropolitan sign
market. 803 F.Supp. 1068, 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
Once the property interest had been identified, the court
detennined whether the sign ordinance deprived the
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